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INTRODUCTION 
The law of unintended consequences is inescapable.  Although the 
criticism of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) reached a 
height more than a decade ago, the damaging effects this law has on 
innovation continues to this day.  Section 1201 of the DMCA contains 
prohibitions on the use of and trafficking in technologies that “effectively 
control[] access to work[s]” protected under the Copyright Act (the “anti-
circumvention provisions”).  In a commendable effort to hedge against their 
own inability to foresee changes in the landscape of technology, Congress 
created a power in the Librarian of Congress (“LOC”) to establish exemptions 
to the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions every three years.1  However, 
such a grant of power only underscores how well Congress is aware that the 
DMCA could hinder innovation and consumer choice, and how that body is 
consequently forced to play defense against the negative effects of the law.  
Congress is forced to consider and ratify the selective exemptions that the 
LOC chooses to make regarding who should be exempted. 
A recent controversy involving this section of the DMCA is responsible 
for the Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act 
(“Consumer Choice Act”), signed into law by President Obama.2  Starting in 
2006, the Copyright Office recognized an exemption to §1201 that would 
allow for consumers to unlock their cellphones—a process by which an 
individual purchaser would be able to take a phone purchased, for instance, at 
an AT&T store and use it on Verizon’s network.3 This exemption was 
renewed in 2010, but in 2013 the Copyright Office refused to renew it again.4  
When the exemption was lost, a petition was created on WhiteHouse.gov that 
fetched over 114,000 signatures in favor of allowing cell phone unlocking.5 
The Consumer Choice Act was the result of coordination between the 
“FCC, industry, and Congress,” and allowed consumers “to use their phones 
or mobile devices on any network they choose.”6 This law enshrines the 
 
1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2014).  
2. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement from the President on Unlocking 
Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act, (July 25, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/07/25/statement-president-unlocking-consumer-choice-and-wireless-competition-
a. 
3. Recommendation from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James Billington, 
Librarian of Cong. (Nov. 17, 2006) available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/1201
_recommendation.pdf.  
4. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,260 (Oct. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
5. Jeff Zients and Sen. Patrick Leahy, Answering the Public’s Call, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/08/01/answering-publics-call. 
6. President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
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previously retracted exemption that allows users of cell phones to unlock their 
devices without running afoul of §1201 of the DMCA.7  Thus, the legislation 
officially recognizes a practice that should have arguably never been 
proscribed by copyright law.8  No actual copyright infringement was at issue 
when users simply wanted to use their cellphones on different networks.  The 
DMCA, in this case, was merely a set of handcuffs locking consumers into a 
particular consumption pattern preferred by device manufacturers and 
network carriers.  Moreover, this one fairly narrow, mundane issue—
consumer choice in the use of cellphones – hints at the untold existence of 
other possible alternate uses of devices and technologies that are kept from 
the market because of fears that they won’t pass muster under §1201. 
For instance, it is easy to imagine that the recent anti-trust action against 
Keurig manufacturer Green Mountain Coffee could provide the groundwork 
for §1201 actions to enforce Green Mountain’s market dominance.9  In the 
Keurig case, Treehouse Foods has sued Green Mountain for violating the 
Sherman Act on the grounds that Green Mountain will begin to issue new 
machines that are only capable of reading their own proprietary label format.10 
Assuming for the moment that Green Mountain prevails on this action and are 
able to manufacture these new software-protected machines, it is a short leap 
of legal reasoning away to connect the coffee makers to the DMCA.  Green 
Mountain makes an effective technological protection measure pre-loaded on 
their coffee makers.  A competitor who wants to sell coffee K-Cups to the 
very large Keurig market would need to create labels that are compatible with 
 
7. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act Managers’ 
Amendment to S.517, https://www.leahy.senate.gov/download/onepager_-unlocking-consumer-
choice-and-wireless-competition-act (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
8. Id.  Much of the criticism around § 1201 has involved the observation that it can be used to 
create business advantage, even without copyright infringement.  In the hearings to the cellphone 
locking bill, Representative Zoe Lofgren notes that, “[i]t’s not Congress’ role to tell people the 
business model they should use[.]”  Bryan Suchenski, Does Congress Mean to Enforce Particular 
Business Models with Copyright Law? PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE BLOG, ¶ 4, (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.
publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/does-congress-mean-to-enforce-particular-business-models-
with-copyright-law. Moreover, at the same hearing, Stephen Metalitz, an attorney for several large 
rights-holders, went so far as to observe that the specific intention of § 1201 was not just to protect 
copyright, but also to protect specific business models.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
9. In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
81170 (J.P.M.L. June 9, 2014). See also Karl Bode, Keurig Will Use DRM In New Coffee Maker To 
Lock Out Refill Market, TECHDIRT (Mar. 3, 2014, 5:32 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20140704/07112927780/keurig-begins-demonstrating-its-coffee-drm-system-as-expected-it-
has-nothing-to-do-with-safety.shtml; Mike Masnick, Keurig Begins Demonstrating Its Coffee DRM 
System; As Expected, It Has Nothing To Do With ‘Safety’, TECHDIRT (JULY 9, 2014, 8:51 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140227/06521826371/keurig-will-use-drm-new-coffee-maker-
to-lock-out-refill-market.shtml.  
10. In re Keurig, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81170 at *3. 
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the software in the machines, and to do so would be effectively bypassing a 
technological protection measure.  Thus, an action to protect the market share 
of a coffee machine manufacturer would fall very plausibly within the ambit 
of the DMCA—a law ostensibly written to protect the copyright interests of 
rights holders. 
However, the focus on what exemptions the LOC will recognize, and 
when Congress will fully authorize them by statute, is something of a 
sideshow—at least when judged against the entire framework of §1201 and 
certain defects therein.  In the jurisprudence surrounding the DMCA, there yet 
remains a circuit split regarding important implications of new property rights 
arguably, and accidentally, created in the anti-circumvention provisions.  
Thus, the viability of this law as it is sometimes being applied is far from 
certain until it reaches the Supreme Court. 
Section 1201(a) specifically forbids the circumvention of technological 
protection measures (“TPM”) that effectively control access to a work 
protected under the Copyright Act.11 By contrast, §1201(b) prohibits 
trafficking in devices that enable third parties to circumvent TPMs that 
effectively protect a right of a copyright holder guaranteed under the 
Copyright Act.12  Therefore, §1201(a) appears to provide a cause of action 
when someone merely circumvents a protection measure, regardless of 
whether a particular right of a copyright holder is violated, whereas §1201(b) 
requires that the measure in question actually be in service of protecting a 
right granted under the Copyright Act. 
The Federal Circuit has held that §1201(a), despite its broad language, 
could not reasonably be read to mean that it was forbidden to circumvent a 
TPM, when that measure has no connection to an actual right guaranteed 
under the Copyright Act.13 In the view of the Federal Circuit, without a nexus 
between circumvention and the infringement of a right, §1201(a) would create 
a nearly unbounded new property right that extends far beyond the scope of 
what one would consider a copyright.14 
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit believes that the plain language of the text 
of §1201(a), coupled with certain readings of the legislative history, compel it 
to recognize a broad access control right.15 In reaching its holding, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged the arguments underlying the Federal Circuit’s opinion, 
 
11. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).  
12. Id. at § 1201(b). 
13. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
14. Id. 
15. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 946 (9th Cir. 2010) opinion 
amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, No. 09-15932, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir.  Feb. 17, 
2011). 
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and dismissed them as mere policy considerations.16 
This Paper examines the tensions between these two positions.  Much of 
the reasoning in both opinions turned on statutory interpretation techniques, 
with each court relying on a different set of suppositions regarding how best 
to interpret §1201.  Ultimately, this Paper will take the position that the 
Federal Circuit is on the better constitutional and statutory interpretation 
ground for various reasons, and that the Supreme Court should see §1201 as 
requiring an infringement nexus. 
Part I of this Paper describes in more detail the tension between the Ninth 
Circuit and the Federal Circuit regarding the proper construction of §1201.  
Part II then examines the constitutional implications of the Ninth Circuit’s “no 
nexus” position.  Part III moves on to examine the various statutory 
interpretation techniques employed by both courts, and the strengths and 
weaknesses of each. 
I. CIRCUIT SPLIT: SKYLINK AND MDY 
A. Skylink 
Chamberlain v. Skylink is a seminal case in the Federal Circuit dealing 
with §1201 anti-circumvention interpretation.17  In Chamberlain, the Federal 
Circuit held that, in order to succeed under a §1201(a)(2) access violation 
claim, a plaintiff must show that the circumventing technology infringes or 
facilitates others in infringing some right guaranteed to the plaintiff under the 
Copyright Act.18  This requirement has been called the “infringement nexus 
requirement.”19 
The plaintiff, Chamberlain, a seller of garage door systems, protected its 
garage doors with a security system based on a “rolling code.”20 This rolling 
code system continually rotated the transmitter frequency needed to open the 
door, thus allowing enhanced security against criminal entry.21  The 
defendant, Skylink, manufactured a universal transmitter system that was 
designed to interoperate with a variety of garage door systems, including the 
plaintiff’s.22  Chamberlain sued Skylink under §1201(a)(2), alleging that 
Skylink’s garage door opening system evaded a TPM embodied in the 
 
16. Id. 
17. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1203. 
18. Id.  
19. MDY, 629 F.3d at 948. 
20. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1203. 
21. Id. at 1183. 
22. Id. at 1185. 
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“rolling code” system.23  Therefore, by selling such systems, Chamberlain 
alleged that Skylink had trafficked in devices designed to circumvent TPMs, 
and was in violation of §1201(a)(2).24 
The district court found for Skylink, basing its holding on the idea that, 
because Chamberlain had never restricted its customers’ use of competing 
transmitters, the customers were implicitly authorized to use Skylink’s 
product.25 Thus, with the implied authorization, there was no unauthorized 
access in violation of §1201.26 
The Federal Circuit upheld the district court, but it did so on other 
grounds.  The Federal Circuit held that without either a copyright 
infringement, or the facilitation of infringement, §1201(a)(2) could not be 
applied.27  In so doing, the Federal Circuit opined that the access provision 
was necessarily tied to a copyright owner’s rights, and could not operate as a 
free-floating provision.28 Under the Federal Circuit’s reading of §1201(a)(2), 
the DMCA did not create a brand new access right unmoored from the rights 
guaranteed under §106 of the Copyright Act.29  The rights provided by 
§1201(a)(2) were to a new cause of action, and not to a new form of property 
right.30  Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that, in order to prevail under 
§1201(a)(2), a plaintiff needed to demonstrate a reasonable relationship 
between the circumvention device and the potential for it to violate a §106 
right.31 
The Federal Circuit clarified how §1201(a)(2) functions by describing 
three possible situations: (1) parties that traffic in circumvention devices may 
be subject to liability whether they infringe or not, because their devices are 
capable of allowing others to infringe; (2) parties that use such devices could 
theoretically be liable for infringement per se under §106; and (3) parties who 
provide circumvention devices that do not facilitate infringement, but 
nonetheless enable the circumvention of an access control measure, will not 
be subject to §1201  liability.32  The upshot of the Federal Circuit’s position is 
that §1201(a)(2) did not create a new right, but only a new cause of action 
linked to the rights already guaranteed under the Copyright Act. 
 
23. Id. at 1183. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 1187–88 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 1202–03. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 1192–93. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 1195. 
32. Id. 
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Chamberlain based its holding on a number of factors, several of which 
are relevant for our purposes here.  Citing legislative history, the court noted 
that the DMCA was enacted in order to create a workable balance between 
users and content providers in the new digital age.33  Reasoning from this 
proposition, the Federal Circuit believed that a nexus requirement was 
necessary in order to properly strike that balance.34  More importantly, the 
Federal Circuit recognized that an access control right unmoored from the 
§106 rights would allow copyright holders license to act in undesirable 
ways.35 For instance, a copyright holder could defeat Fair Use defenses 
merely by wrapping content in an effective, if technologically trivial, 
protection measure.36  Chamberlain also recognized the possibility of “absurd 
and disastrous results” that would follow from reading §1201(a)(2) literally.37  
Among these was, for instance, the possibility of treating a home burglar 
alarm as an effective access control measure on the copyrighted books within 
a residence, leading to liability under the DMCA for disabling the burglar 
alarm.38 As the court observed: 
[According to] Chamberlain’s proposed construction, explicated at 
oral argument, disabling a burglar alarm to gain “access” to a home 
containing copyrighted books, music, art, and periodicals would 
violate the DMCA; anyone who did so would unquestionably have 
“circumvented a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a work protected under [the Copyright Act].” . . . The 
appropriate deterrents to this type of behavior lie in tort law and 
criminal law, not in copyright law. Yet, were we to read the statute’s 
“plain language” as Chamberlain urges, disabling a burglar alarm 
would be a per se violation of the DMCA.39 
Further, Chamberlain noted that Congress’s authority to enact the DMCA 
was questionable, and some constructions of the statute could run afoul of the 
Constitution.40  The court noted that a nexus requirement must exist within the 
 
33. Id. at 1196 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 26 (1998)). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 1201. 
36. Id.  The Ninth Circuit is not alone in disagreeing with the Federal Circuit in this regard.  
In Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443-44 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit held 
that the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions were unconcerned with the use to which content was 
put once the TPMs were bypassed.  This extended to even possible Fair Uses.  
37. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 1200. 
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law in order to make it a rational use of power because, otherwise, the bare 
language could lead to the creation of monopoly over public domain works.41 
Without an infringement nexus, a party could add a trivial amount of 
copyrighted material together with expired or otherwise public domain 
content.  If he then adds a simple protection scheme to the combined content, 
under the DMCA, he would obtain a right over the public domain content he 
could not otherwise have had.42 For instance, imagine that a previously 
unknown Shakespeare manuscript is discovered, the authorship of which is 
proven beyond dispute.  Technically, this work should exist in the public 
domain.  However, imagine that the discoverer writes a forward for the piece, 
and packages it together in a paid digital download that is acquired only after 
acknowledging a restrictive licensing agreement.  Reverse engineering the 
protection on said file in order to extract the purely public domain content 
would amount to a violation of §1201, even though the content being sought 
is strictly public domain material. 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit observed that without an infringement 
nexus, the Copyright Act could become contradictory.43  The court observed 
that §1201(c)(1) explicitly directs that “nothing in this section shall affect 
rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including 
Fair Use, under this title.”44  Under the Federal Circuit’s view, if §1201(a)(2) 
truly were creating a new right unmoored from the §106 list of rights, it would 
be in effect altering rights, remedies and defenses under the Copyright Act.45  
According to the Federal Circuit, “[a] provision that prohibited access without 
regard to the rest of the Copyright Act would clearly affect rights and 
limitations, if not remedies and defenses” that would “flatly contradict 
§1201(c)(1).”46 
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that Skylink, having neither infringed a 
right nor enabled infringement, was not liable under §1201(a)(2).47 
 
41. Id. 
42. This particular example contemplates material that may be rare in some fashion, but 
otherwise considered public domain.   
43. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200. 
44. Id.  
45. Id.   
46. Id. Note again that this stands in contrast to the Second Circuit’s position regarding Fair 
Use and the DMCA.  In considering whether § 1201(c)(1) does in fact prohibit expanding a broad 
access right, the Second Circuit held that “the DMCA targets the circumvention of digital walls 
guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in circumvention tools), but does not concern itself 
with the use of those materials after circumvention has occurred.” Universal City Studios v. Corley, 
273 F.3d 429, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2001).  
47. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200. 
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B. MDY 
MDY v. Blizzard involved a dispute over the use of third party software to 
alter the game playing experience of the popular online role-playing game 
World of Warcraft (“WoW”).48  WoW provides a real-time simulated fantasy 
world in which users create characters, such as elves and orcs, and amass 
experience, equipment, and virtual gold.49  Within WoW there were various 
player-to-player and in-game facilities that enabled users to acquire virtual 
gold and in-game equipment.50  Michael Donnely (“MDY”) wrote a computer 
program, know as a “bot,” called “Glider” that would automatically play a 
person’s characters in WoW.51  This allowed such users to more quickly 
advance through the game than users who did not employ the bot software.52 
Before a user can access the WoW virtual world they must agree to an 
End User License Agreement (“EULA”) as well as a Terms of Use (“TOU”) 
policy.53  Although initially Blizzard may not have explicitly disallowed the 
use of bots in their EULA or TOU, by late 2005 MDY was admittedly aware 
that bot use was considered a violation of Blizzard’s TOU.54  To combat the 
use of bots, Blizzard created a program named “Warden” that scanned the 
user’s computer to detect bot usage.55  When such a user was found, that user 
was banned from WoW.56  In response, MDY continuously modified Glider 
to evade detection and enable users to continue violating Blizzard’s TOU, 
even after the period in which it was clear that bots were disallowed in 
WoW.57 
The exact extent of Glider’s impact on the WoW experience for non-
Glider users, as well as on Blizzard was disputed.58  Blizzard claimed that 
thousands of users reported complaints about others using Glider.59  Blizzard 
also claimed that it spent nearly $1M each year in order to respond to the 
complaints of unauthorized bots.60  Further, MDY explicitly made its anti-
 
48. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010).  
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 936. 
55. Id. at 935–36. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 936. 
58. Id. at 935–36. 
59. Id. at 936. 
60. Id. Blizzard claimed it received 465,000 complaints, of which “several thousand” named 
Glider.  Thus, the full cost of $1,000,000 would not be directly attributable to Glider, although, some 
significant percentage would be so attributable. 
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detection software in such a way as to waste Blizzard’s resources when it tried 
to root out the bot usage.61  The goal for MDY was “to make it bad business 
to spend that much time altering their detection code to find Glider[.]”62 
There were two primary causes of action in MDY.  First, Blizzard asserted 
a claim of contributory or vicarious copyright infringement that focused on an 
aspect of the case not relevant to the subject of this Paper.63  In the second 
issue, however, Blizzard alleged that MDY was liable under §1201 of the 
DMCA for creating and distributing the technological means of defeating 
Warden, Blizzard’s access protection measure for WoW.64 
The district court held that MDY’s program violated both §1201(a) (the 
access provision) as well as §1201(b) (the “rights” provision) by allowing 
users of WoW to bypass the Warden program when playing the game online.  
As will be discussed in depth, infra, the Ninth Circuit agreed, ultimately 
holding that §1201(a) creates, in essence, a right of action for copyright 
holders that does not depend on an actual violation of their statutorily granted 
rights in 17 U.S.C. §106.65 
Primarily, the Ninth Circuit reached this result by parsing the plain text of 
§1201.66  First, the court noted that §1201(a) and §1201(b) explicitly point out 
the basis upon which protection is afforded.67  On the one hand, §1201(a)(2) 
is directed only to “works protected under [the Copyright Act,]” while 
§1201(b)(1) is concerned with the “right of a copyright owner under [the 
Copyright Act.]”  The court treated this textual difference as indicating that 
§1201(b)(1) required a violation of the rights guaranteed under §106 of the 
Copyright Act, while §1201(a)(2) intended to create a new right for copyright 
holders to “prevent circumvention of access controls . . . [on] copyrighted 
works.”68 
Second, the court observed that the examples given in the DMCA to 
illustrate what it means to “circumvent a technological measure” were things 
such as “descrambling a scrambled work” or “decrypting an encrypted 
work.”69  Neither of these activities is per se an activity that infringes upon a 
right guaranteed in §106.70  The Ninth Circuit also noted that  §1201(a)(1)(B)-
 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 938–42. 
64. Id. at 942. 
65. Id. at 944. 
66. Id. at 944–46. 
67. Id. at 944. 
68. Id. at 945. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
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(D) directed the Library of Congress to determine uses of copyrighted works 
that were non-infringing, but would otherwise run afoul of the Access 
provision.71 
The Ninth Circuit rested the balance of its opinion upon legislative 
history, observing that the Senate Judiciary Committee felt that §1201(a) did 
not require an anti-circumvention clause, but only an anti-trafficking clause, 
because the current copyright law as of the enactment of the DMCA already 
prohibited infringement.72  Therefore, the law needed only create a ban on 
trafficking in the tools that enabled infringement.73  By contrast, there had 
been no right available generally providing for copyright holders that allowed 
them to prevent others from circumventing access control measures.74 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit then characterized the Federal Circuit’s nexus 
requirement as being born out of policy considerations.75  Once so 
characterized, the Ninth Circuit believed such considerations were only for 
Congress to consider, and that the Federal Circuit had failed to recognize the 
proper statutory construction that supported its decision in MDY.76 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NO-NEXUS APPROACH 
The Ninth Circuit felt that the text of §1201 totally controlled its 
decision77—an assertion that will be examined in detail in Part III, infra.  
However, even assuming that courts are bound to strictly interpret only the 
bare words contained in a statute, there are problematic constitutional 
implications with the manner in which the Ninth Circuit has read the scope of 
§1201 in MDY. 
To understand the nature of this dilemma, we must first examine the 
source of Congress’s power to enact the DMCA.  At least two possible 
constitutional justifications exist for Congress’s promulgation of the DMCA: 
the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause.  Each will be examined in 
turn. 
A. The Copyright Clause 
Section 1201 of the Copyright Act, the DMCA’s provisions relating to the 
 
71. Id. at 945–56. 
72. Id. at 945. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 950. 
76. Id. 
77. The court felt further analysis beyond the text was unnecessary “because of the clarity of 
the statute’s text.” Id. 
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circumvention of TPMs, is authorized pursuant to some particular grant of 
Constitutional power to Congress.  The power to create laws governing 
copyrights, and thus the power to create the Copyright Act, flows from Article 
I, §8, Clause 8 (“Copyright Clause”) of the United States Constitution.  This 
clause provides that Congress “shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]” 
Indeed, in a seminal case recognizing the requirement that a work must be 
sufficiently creative in order to advance the progress of the useful arts, the 
Second Circuit observed that the Copyright Act would be void were it not to 
serve the ends strictly provided for in the Copyright Clause.78  Moreover, the 
courts are obliged to construe the provisions of the Copyright Act, if possible, 
in such a way that their operation falls within the ambit of the Copyright 
Clause.79  Although earlier courts had speculated that Congress might have 
the ability to regulate copyrights under its Commerce Clause power,80 
Congress itself has foreclosed that possibility as of the 1976 act.81  Therefore, 
in order to be a valid exercise of power, any provision within the Copyright 
Act must be directed toward the securing of some exclusive right to a 
protected work. 
It should also be noted that the protection of copyrights within the United 
States is wholly statutory.82  The earlier distinction between federal and 
common law copyrights has largely diminished.83  Before 1978, there had 
been some room for common law to operate in the area of unpublished 
 
78. “The first question with which we must deal is that of the validity of the copyright. Our 
starting point must be the Constitution. For, as the [C]onstitutional power to enact the Copyright Act, 
17 U.S.C.A. § 1 [(1976)] et seq., derives from Article 1, Sec. 8, that Act would be void if it went 
beyond granting monopolies (or exclusive franchises) to authorize whose works ‘promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts.’ . . . [W]e must, if possible, so construe the statute as to avoid 
holding it unconstitutional.”  Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 512–13 (2d Cir. 1945).  
79. Id. 
80. Chamberlin, 150 F.2d at 512; Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.) 
(patent case), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651 (1942). 
81. “[T]here is no intention to deal with the question of whether Congress can or should offer 
the equivalent of copyright protection under some constitutional provision other than the patent-
copyright clause of article 1, section 8.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976). See Dowling v. 
United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). 
82. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 15 (1908) superseded by statute 
on other grounds, London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 182 (D. Mass. 2008) 
and M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 433 (4th Cir.  1986); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) (“copyright property under the Federal is wholly statutory, and 
depends upon the right created under the acts of Congress passed in pursuance of the authority 
conferred under (the Copyright Clause)”). 
83. 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 2.02 (2014). 
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works.84  However, since 1978, §301(a) of the Copyright Act has fully 
preempted common law for all works that fall under the ambit of federal 
copyright law statutes.85 Therefore, the rights that the Copyright Act protects 
must be enumerated somewhere within the Copyright Act itself, and cannot 
be implied from a background common law. 
The question asked herein is whether the access right provided for in 
§1201 satisfies the foregoing Constitutional sketch by providing rights holders 
with a cause of action to vindicate an enumerated right guaranteed under the 
Copyright Act?  The Copyright Clause is admittedly somewhat under-
theorized in both the case law and the legislative history of the clause.86  
However, from a textual perspective, the Copyright Clause directs that 
Congress protect “the exclusive Right” to works of content creators for 
limited times. 
As described above, without the benefit of a common law property right 
operating in the background of the federal law, the nature of a right must be 
explicitly defined.  Section 106 of the Copyright Act, for instance, enumerates 
a specific set of well-defined rights that the federal law protects.  By contrast, 
§1201(a)(2) prohibits the violation of a nebulous access right nowhere else 
defined within the Copyright Act.  Section 1201 expands by implication the 
set of rights guaranteed by §106 to essentially include the right of controlling 
the mode of accessing a work, even when the access itself would not violate 
the terms of §106. 
Under a literal reading of §1201(a), “owners of a work protected by both 
copyright and a technological measure that effectively controls access to that 
work . . . would possess unlimited rights to hold circumventors liable . . . 
merely for accessing that work, even if that access enabled only rights that the 
Copyright Act grants to the public.”87  This is, of course, contrasted by the 
Ninth Circuit’s position in MDY, as well as by the Second Circuit’s position 
in Corley that the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions were unconcerned 
with the use to which content was put once the TPMs were bypassed88—
 
84. Id. 
85. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2014). 
86. 1-1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.02 (2014); 
“There was very little discussion of the Intellectual Property Clause among the Framers; there is no 
record of any debate over it at the Federal Convention.” Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property 
and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 338 (2004) (emphasis original). See Thomas B. 
Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
33, 65 (2003) (“We know almost nothing about the process of authorship or of authors’ 
responsiveness to the incentives offered them by the copyright system; it is virtually certain that the 
Framers knew even less.”). 
87. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1200–02 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
88. Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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possible Fair Uses of such content notwithstanding.89 Nonetheless, the Federal 
Circuit’s position represents at least another tension within the current 
jurisprudence surrounding the interpretation of §1201 that can only to be 
resolved by the Supreme Court.  A further problem, as the court in 
Chamberlain observed, is that an unbounded access right potentially expands 
a party’s entitlements to include capturing public domain works.90 
Thus, if the Ninth Circuit is correct that Congress intended to allow 
§1201(a)(2) to operate without a nexus between circumvention and the 
violation of a protected right, 1201(a)(2) may violate the scope of 
Congressional power outlined in the Copyright Clause. 
1. Paracopyright and the Commerce Clause 
It is also possible to conceptualize the DMCA as an exercise of the 
Commerce Clause power.  In United States v. Elcom,91 the District Court for 
the Northern District of California was faced with a constitutional challenge 
to the DMCA on the grounds that it exceeded the constitutional limitations of 
the Copyright Clause.92  The Elcom court recognized that the DMCA was not 
in fact a true enactment under the Copyright Clause, but was instead a sort of 
“paracopyright” statute that was validly enacted under the Commerce 
Clause.93 
However, as the Elcom court recognized, Congress cannot use the 
Commerce Clause to eradicate a limitation on its power granted under another 
clause.94  To resolve this issue, the Elcom court held that: 
If the statute passed by Congress “is not fundamentally inconsistent 
with” the Intellectual Property clause and is otherwise within 
Congress’ Commerce Power to enact, then the statute is not an 
unconstitutional exercise of congressional power.95 
The Elcom court then recognized that the DMCA, even if merely 
paracopyright, was consistent with the Copyright Clause because it provided 
the economic incentives that promote the progress of the arts.96 
 
89. Id. 
90. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200.  See discussion supra Part II(a).  
91. United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1140. 
94. Id. at 1139 (citing United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 1999)); 
see also Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982). 
95. Id. at 1139–40. 
96. Id. at 1140. 
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However, it is important to note, that under Elcom’s reasoning if there 
was in fact a “fundamental inconsistency” with the Copyright Clause in the 
interpretation of a statute, such interpretation would be improper, 
constitutionally speaking.97  Thus, Congress is not entitled to use its very 
broad Commerce Power to make an end-run around a limitation imposed 
upon it by the Copyrights Clause. 
Other courts and commentators have likewise recognized that Congress 
cannot evade the limits of one clause of the Constitution by resort to another.  
Professor Perzanowski has observed that “[u]nless the limits of Clause 8 cabin 
the commerce power, those limits are effectively stricken from the 
Constitution, despite the Framers’ best efforts to ensure that they could not be 
ignored.”98  Further, in Moghadan, the 11th Circuit held that an exercise of 
Commerce power is bound by the Copyright clause to the extent that the 
regulation in question is fundamentally inconsistent with Congress’s 
Copyright power.99 
Other courts have proposed a different test for determining when 
Congress exceeds its Copyright power.  In United States v. Martignon, for 
instance, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that 
statutes enacted under the Commerce Power that provided “copyright-like” 
rights should be bound under the Copyright Clause limitations.100  In 
determining whether a statute was “copyright-like,” the court used the fact 
that the statute it was examining was placed within Title 17 as persuasive 
evidence.101 
What is suggested here is not that the entire DMCA is unconstitutional, as 
was argued in Elcom.  Neither is it here the contention that §1201 is per se 
unconstitutional.  Instead, the contention is that the manner in which the Ninth 
Circuit has read §1201 leads to a constitutional paradox that creates a 
fundamental inconsistency with the Copyright Clause. 
As noted in Elcom and Railway Labor Executives, Congress cannot use 
 
97. Id. 
98. Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Penumbral Public Domain: Constitutional Limits on Quasi-
Copyright Legislation, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1081, 1082 (2008). 
99. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281. 
100. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated and 
remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
101. Id. On appeal, the District Court was overturned.  The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit did not directly rebuke the notion that Congress may be limited in its Commerce power but a 
limitation within the Copyright Act.  Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152.  The Second Circuit felt that the 
balance of how “copyright-like” the statute in question was did not balance in favor of finding it an 
exercise of Copyright power.  Id.  However, according to at least one commentator, the Second 
Circuit missed the entire point of the District Court’s analysis.  Perzanowski, supra note 98, at 1140. 
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the Commerce Clause to evade a limitation of the Copyright Clause.102  Under 
the terms of the Copyright Clause, Congress must secure to authors a limited 
monopoly on their own works.  Moreover, the purpose of the Copyright 
Clause is to give the public appropriate access to such works.103 
However, as noted in Part II(a), supra, under the Ninth Circuit’s reading 
of §1201, individuals could assert property right claims over both public 
domain works as well as the copyrighted works of others.  The Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged and dismissed this position by characterizing the Chamberlain 
concerns as policy driven and consequently subordinate to a plain text reading 
of §1201(a)(2).104  Elcom felt similarly about the potential use of the DMCA 
to monopolize public domain works when it said that “[n]othing within the 
DMCA grants any rights to anyone in any public domain work.  A public 
domain work remains in the public domain and any person may make use of 
the public domain work for any purpose.”105 
However, merely because the Ninth Circuit or the court in Elcom may 
wish to dismiss this concern does not make it invalid.  The situation remains 
that without a nexus requirement, the Ninth Circuit’s reading of §1201 
provides no principled basis for excluding the Federal Circuit’s concerns.  It is 
entirely possible that a person could obtain some public domain work that is 
in limited supply, reproduce it and protect it with a technological measure that 
grants to them an exclusive control over the public domain work that they 
would not have otherwise been able to obtain. When coupled with a licensing 
agreement, a party will be able to reap a monopolistic profit on a work that 
should otherwise be available in the public domain. 
Section 1201 essentially converts copyright protection from a scheme 
intended to reward authors for original works of creativity into a way of 
rewarding companies that invest in developing technological barriers around 
content. While there is nothing wrong, per se, with rewarding the efforts of 
companies who are in the business of developing such protection measures, 
surely it is perverse to rely upon a copyright law in order to ensure their 
profits. 
Therefore, under either the Copyright Clause or the Commerce clause, the 
 
102. “Railway Labor, Perry, and the Head Money Cases all embrace the notion that limits 
contained within one enumerated power can constrain legislation otherwise permissible under 
another grant of authority.”  Id. at 1094. 
103. Under the Copyright Clause, Congress is directed to “the task of defin[e] the scope of the 
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . in order to give the public appropriate access 
to their work product.” Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1200 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2003)). 
104. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010). 
105. United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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Ninth Circuit’s application of §1201 may be constitutionally problematic.  As 
noted above, the Ninth Circuit’s reading of §1201 appears to be outside the 
scope of the Copyright Clause.  Further, since the Commerce Clause cannot 
be used to end run around the limitations of the Copyright Clause, and the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation leads to implications that are squarely at odds 
with the Copyright Clause, the Commerce Clause cannot justify the Ninth 
Circuit’s reading. 
III. THE ACCESS RIGHT AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The ideal court opinion marries fidelity to the statutory scheme with 
salutary incentives. Unfortunately, that amiable synthesis is unavailable, 
insofar as the anti-circumvention statute is concerned . . . the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act in 1998 . . . has led to a situation in which no 
perfect judicial construction presents itself.106 
The Ninth Circuit essentially dismissed the Federal Circuit’s concerns 
over the alteration of the scope of rights and remedies related to copyright.107  
It opined that the creation of a new access right somehow evaded expanding 
or altering the “rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright 
infringement”108 without explaining why.109  It is here that the Ninth Circuit 
appears to be hanging its hat when it characterizes the Federal Circuit’s 
concerns as mere policy considerations, and its own holding as firmly rooted 
in the text of §1201.  However, the Federal Circuit’s holding could be read a 
couple of different ways: either as a set of policy concerns, or as an 
expression of the ambiguity contained within the Access provision in the 
context of the Copyright Act and the DMCA.  Although the Ninth Circuit 
preferred to view the issue as open and shut, citing the “clarity of the statute’s 
text,”110 the possibilities raised by the Federal Circuit highlight the Ninth 
Circuit’s problematic construction of §1201. 
Given this situation, the circuit split in question requires a careful 
statutory interpretation analysis.111 Based on the concerns raise by the Ninth 
Circuit and the Federal Circuit, the relevant canons to consider are (1) 
textualism, (2) legislative history, (3) the rule against superfluities, and (4) the 
 
106. 3-12A MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 12A.06 
(2014). 
107. MDY, 629 F.3d at 950. 
108. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1)(2014). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Before undertaking this endeavor, it is of course important to note that § 1201 is 
statutory law, and not constitutional law.  Therefore, Congress is at liberty to redefine the law as it 
sees fit, even if this split reaches the Supreme Court. 
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golden rule, which guards against absurd results. Following a discussion of 
the canons and how they apply to the anti-circumvention provisions, I will 
examine some of the pragmatic concerns around statutory interpretation, 
including institutional concerns and recent empirical research that 
demonstrates how the aforementioned canons have been received by the 
Supreme Court. 
A. Canons of Interpretation 
1. Textualism 
The first battleground over the proper interpretation of §1201 is on the 
textualist front.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit felt the issue was almost entirely 
disposed of by a recitation of the text of the statute.112  Further, from the Ninth 
Circuit’s perspective, to adapt a nexus requirement would “disregard the plain 
language of the statute[.]”113  The Ninth Circuit’s impulse is not unfounded.  
According to research performed by Professor Krishnakumar, textualism is 
cited most often as the preferred interpretive lens by Supreme Court 
justices.114  Moreover, it is an oft-cited and reasonable evocation of courts 
that, when faced with a statute, interpretation must “begin, as always, with the 
text of the statute.”115 
However, notwithstanding the presentation of textualism as a sort of 
interpretive gatekeeper, textual interpretation is not an absolute method for 
resolving even apparently clear language in a statute.116  In his Chison v. 
Roemer dissent, Justice Scalia laid out the textualist statutory interpretation 
strategy: 
[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual 
context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask 
whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning 
other than the ordinary one applies. If not—and especially if a good 
 
112. The court felt further analysis beyond the text was unnecessary “because of the clarity of 
the statute’s text.” MDY, 629 F.3d at 950. 
113. Id. 
114. This was an empirical study of the decisions from 2005 through 2008.  I am relying upon 
these numbers as a general trend, but of course, as membership of the Court shifts, these approaches 
may shift as well.  Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: 
An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 279 (2010) (Table 3). 
115. Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009) (quoting Permanent Mission 
of India to United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 197 (2007)). 
116. “It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to evidence in 
order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude 
consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 
U.S. 41, 48 (1928). 
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reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain—we apply that 
ordinary meaning.117 
This view of textualism has long been a part of the Supreme Court’s 
approach to statutory interpretation.  For instance, in the seminal statutory 
interpretation case of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457 (1892), a Church contracted with a resident of England to come to the 
United States and work as a pastor and rector.118  The United States 
prosecuted, claiming that the contract was forbidden by the act of February 
26, 1885, 23 Stat. 332, c. 164.119 The statute read in relevant part: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any . . . corporation . . . to prepay the 
transportation. . . of any alien . . . under contract . . . to perform labor 
or service of any kind in the United States[.]120 
The Court acknowledged that the contract in question was certainly within 
the letter of the Act, but was nevertheless not a transaction that Congress 
intended to be punishable under the Act.121  In support of its holding, the 
Court opined that “[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter 
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor 
within the intention of its makers.”122  Moreover, the Court did not believe 
that such an approach to legislative interpretation constituted a displacement 
of the legislators’ will in favor of the judge’s.123  The Court based this 
position on the fact that: 
[F]requently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words 
broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of 
the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its 
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such 
broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the 
legislator intended to include the particular act.124 
Along these lines, the Court has held that a literal interpretation of Title 
 
117. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
118. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 457–58 (1892). 
119. Id. at 458. 
120. Id. at 458. 
121. Id. at 459. 
122. Id.  
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was inappropriate when considering 
affirmative action programs.125  United Steelworkers v. Weber presented a 
dispute over whether Title VII prevented private employers from voluntarily 
implementing affirmative action plans.126 The allegation was that such 
affirmative action programs constituted impermissible racial discrimination 
under Title VII, which made it unlawful to “discriminate . . . because of . . .  
race.”127 The Court rejected this literal interpretation of Title VII on the 
grounds that it would effectively frustrate the intention of congress to 
ameliorate the adverse conditions that black workers faced in the economy.128 
In other contexts, textualism likewise has not presented an absolute barrier 
to statutory interpretation.  In Rapanos v. United States, for instance, Justice 
Scalia found that the interpretation of the phrase “in the waters of the United 
States” could not mean what it plainly said.129  To interpret the phrase to 
literally mean every body of water in the United States would lead to the 
absurd consequence of allowing the Federal Government to step over its 
Constitutional limitations and regulate waterways that were purely within the 
purview of State governments.130  Justice Scalia based this departure from the 
plain text on the basis that such an interpretation would exceed the bounds of 
the Commerce Clause.131 
Thus, although textualism provides a strong anchor for most of the 
members of the Supreme Court in one fashion or another, when there is a 
statutory construction before it that may lead to absurd results or 
unconstitutional implications, the Court is unlikely to end with the text in the 
manner suggested by the Ninth Circuit in MDY. 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain 
recognized the nuance that attends to even avowedly plain text approaches to 
statutes.  “Congress chose [the language of §1201] consistent with its stated 
intent to balance two sets of concerns pushing in opposite directions.”132 This 
is to say, the words used in §1201 certainly are meant to provide a roadmap 
for judges in understanding how to apply the DMCA to cases.  They can only 
be meaningfully understood by considering the whole context of §1201 within 
the DMCA, the Copyright Act, and the general federal law. 
However, even assuming for the moment that the Ninth Circuit’s strict 
 
125. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979).   
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 202. 
129. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 737–38 (2006). 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
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textualist preference is sound, and that we should only examine the printed 
words of the statute, the no-nexus approach still doesn’t make obvious sense.  
Sections 1201(a) and 1201(b) explicitly limit the scope of the DMCA’s anti-
circumvention provisions to “a work protected under this title” – thus the 
work protected by the circumvention provisions must be one also protected by 
copyright law.  Obviously, this would not apply to public domain works, or 
works owned by authors other than a plaintiff.  Section 1201(c) goes on to 
state that “nothing in this section shall affect rights . . . under this title.” 
Further, the right that the Ninth Circuit believes is created by §1201(a) is 
not explicitly stated in the text—it is an inference of the section.  The law 
does not say something such as “Copyright holders shall now have an 
additional right to control the use of their content.”  It simply prohibits the 
circumvention of TPMs.  So, this begs the question: how can the law 
explicitly say it will not affect rights, make no mention of the creation of a 
new right, and yet be read with a strict textualist’s eye to hold that there is a 
new property right created? Put simply, it cannot.  In order to protect, a TPM 
must have some object of protection.  Protecting a work “under this title” 
cannot be enough – it needs to protect a specific property right granted by the 
Copyright Act.  Taken as a whole, the strict textualist approach will not do the 
work that the Ninth Circuit believes it can do. 
2. Beyond Textualism 
This Paper will not survey every canon of interpretation, merely the ones 
that featured in either the MDY or Chamberlain opinions, or which appear 
particularly relevant in light of the nature of the dispute.  This section will 
look at the use of legislative history; the judicial practice of avoiding 
interpretations that render clauses superfluous; and the “golden rule”—the 
mandate to avoid interpretations that reach absurd conclusions.  Given these 
interpretive lenses, this section will conclude with pragmatic considerations 
based on empirical studies of the trends in judicial opinions. 
a. Legislative History 
Legislative History is one means of divining the legislative intent of the 
Congress that enacted a particular statute.As noted above, in Church of the 
Holy Trinity, the Court famously moved past the plain text of the statute to 
examine “the evil which [the statute] is designed to remedy.”133  Indeed, 
throughout much of the twentieth century, legislative history was relied upon 
in construing statutes before the Supreme Court.134 
 
133. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 457 (1892). 
134. David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of 
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The Ninth Circuit, believing that the textual structure of §1201 
communicated a clear congressional intent to create an access right,135 made 
much use of legislative history in reaching the MDY holding.  Relying on the 
Senate Judiciary’s Report, the Ninth Circuit observed the committee’s opinion 
that “§§1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) are ‘not interchangeable,’” and that they were 
“designed to protect two distinct rights.”136  Further, “§1201(a)(2) ‘is designed 
to protect access to a copyrighted work,’ while §1201(b)(1) ‘is designed to 
protect the traditional copyright rights of the copyright owner.’”137 The Ninth 
Circuit went on: 
The Senate Judiciary Committee proffered an example of §1201(a) 
liability with no nexus to infringement, stating that if an owner 
effectively protected access to a copyrighted work by use of a 
password, it would violate §1201(a)(2)(A). [T]o defeat or bypass the 
password and to make the means to do so, as long as the primary 
purpose of the means was to perform this kind of act. This is roughly 
analogous to making it illegal to break into a house using a tool, the 
primary purpose of which is to break into houses.138 
It of course bears acknowledging that in the case of breaking into a house 
using thieves’ tools, the act of breaking into a house is always forbidden.  In 
such a case, it of course makes sense that a legislature may contemplate 
banning those tools expressly designed for this purpose.  Implied within the 
very hypothetical is the nexus between the malum prohibitum and the means 
of accomplishing it.  However, in the case of §1201, you can be liable for a 
wrong without ever having acted in a way that would otherwise violate the 
law. 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Federal Circuit took a different view 
of legislative intent.  The Federal Circuit acknowledged that Congress 
intended to create new causes of action for circumvention and for trafficking 
in devices that enable circumvention.139  However, “Congress did not choose 
to create new property rights.”140 The Federal Circuit felt that to interpret 
Congress’s words otherwise, would be to upset the balance of rights and 
 
Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1715 (2010). 
135. According to the Ninth Circuit, “there is significant textual evidence showing Congress’s 
intent to create a new anti-circumvention right in § 1201(a) distinct from infringement.” MDY 
Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010).MDY, 629 F.3d at 950. 
136. Id. at 946–47. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 950 (citing  S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 12). 
139. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
140. Id. 
STOUT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2015  1:42 PM 
206 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 19:2 
 
obligations in the Copyright Act, and to frustrate Congressional intent.141 
Further, “Congress chose words consistent with its stated intent to balance 
two sets of concerns pushing in opposite directions.”142  In the Federal 
Circuit’s view, the DMCA developed broad categories for both liability as 
well as exemption, and left the careful balancing of those interests up to the 
courts.143 
However, the divergence between the Ninth Circuit and the Federal 
Circuit over the proper legislative history upon which to rely may be purely 
academic.  Legislative history has been an interpretive rule on the decline 
over the last seventy years.144  In part, some of this decline is attributable to 
the changing membership of the Court, but legislative history remains a 
controversial source for judicial interpretation.145 
Various problems have been noted with relying upon legislative history.  
For instance, the Congressional Record, the official organ of Congress for 
reporting proceedings and debate, contains not merely the records of actual 
proceedings, but also “a large quantity of remarks and articles that were 
inserted without actually having been read.”146  This leaves open the question 
of whether the Record is intended to be an accurate collection of Congress’ 
deliberations, or is instead a collection of views that disparate members of 
Congress had regarding a piece of legislation.147 
Further, the contents of committee reports may even contain material that 
was not able to make it through the political process in order to survive a 
vote.148  However, even if legislative intent is a valid way to view an 
ambiguous statute, it has been noted that legislative history provides, at best, a 
problematic documentary record.149 
Justice Scalia, while a judge on the DC Circuit, expressed clearly his 
disdain for relying upon Committee Reports when interpreting statutes.  He 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Law & Zaring, supra note 134, at 1715. 
145. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-an 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
901, 964 (2013). 
146. OTTO J. HETZEL, MICHAEL E. LIBONATI & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE LAW 
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 472 (4th ed. 2008). 
147. Id. 
148. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent And Public Choice, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 423, 442.  Farber and Frickey also outline generally how public choice theory and traditional 
political science suggest that Congress members are largely content to rely upon committee reports 
for explaining a law that comes before them.   
149. Id. at 437. 
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wrote: 
I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details, as 
opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee 
report come to the attention of, much less are approved by, the house 
which enacts the committee’s bill. And I think it time for courts to 
become concerned about the fact that routine deference to the detail of 
committee reports, and the predictable expansion in that detail which 
routine deference has produced, are converting a system of judicial 
construction into a system of committee-staff prescription.150 
In essence, the reliability of legislative history is undermined by judicial 
reliance upon it.  Committee members write to the judges how they want 
cases to come out and thus find a way to possibly short circuit the intent of the 
broader legislature when it votes on the actual statutory language.  There is 
also concern that the legislators themselves never draft or even read the 
committee reports that supposedly form the bedrock of legislative history.151 
These critiques of legislative history are counterbalanced, however, by 
indications that the drafters of legislation are aware of reliance upon such 
history, and purposely write it as an explanatory rule.152  Further, at times, 
when the House votes on a bill they have been known to defer to the relevant 
committee as a proxy for doing their own research, and such committees at 
times rely upon documents resembling legislative history in order to make 
their own vote.153 
Professors Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman have written a 
recent article detailing their empirical research that highlights many 
heretofore-unknown contours of the legislative process.154  Nearly 90% of the 
respondents to Professor Gluck’s survey indicated that legislative history was 
written purposely to serve as an explanation of a statute.155 
However, notwithstanding this fact, there does remain a strong kernel to 
the critique of legislative history.  As unenacted text, it does represent a 
 
150. Hirschey v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 777 F.2d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  
151. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). In reaching his 
conclusion in Hirschey, Justice Scalia cited an anecdote from the Senate involving Senator Dole.  
Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 1 n. 1.  Under questioning from Senator Armstrong, Senator Dole admitted that 
he had not read nor contributed to the Committee Report prepared as part of a tax bill.  Id.  
Ostensibly, much of the construction of the law was therefore built upon the authorship of staffers 
working for Senator Dole. 
152. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 145, at 965–66. 
153. Id. at 968-69. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 970. 
STOUT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2015  1:42 PM 
208 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 19:2 
 
counter-democratic impulse to rely upon it when it very possibly could 
contain language that is at odds with the language of the final enacted 
legislation. 
Professor Gluck acknowledged that there was potential pro-legislative 
history bias among her respondents, as well.  Professor Gluck’s research 
shows that the people who write legislative history think legislative history is 
important.  Notably, the staffers indicated that the most important legislative 
history was committee reports—the sorts of documents they themselves 
drafted.156 They ranked floor speeches, and reports created outside the 
committee system as the least reliable—the sorts of reports that would be 
outside of the respondents’ control.157 
Ultimately, Professor Gluck notes that, despite staffers insistence that 
legislative history was intended as an interpretive tool, Congressional practice 
made it difficult for courts to determine when messages in legislative history 
were meant for them.158  While such history may be useful at some point, 
likely it will not be so until Congress begins to indicate when it is speaking to 
future courts regarding intent in a specific piece of legislation.159 
However, even assuming that legislative history and intent may be useful 
to the Court in examining §1201, the case still weighs against the Ninth 
Circuit’s no-nexus approach.  In light of the Copyright Act in general, and 
1201(c) in particular, the Federal Circuit’s view regarding legislative intent is 
far more plausible.  Sections 1201(a) and 1201(b) explicitly limit the scope of 
the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions to “a work protected under this 
title.”  Thus, for §1201 to apply, according to the clearly stated intent of the 
framers of that provision, the work must be protected by copyright law.  This 
would not apply to public domain works, or works owned by other authors.  
Further, §1201(c) states that, “Nothing in this section shall affect rights . . . 
under this title.”  Therefore, the rather clear intent of §1201, when viewed in 
context of all of the anti-circumvention provisions taken together, cannot 
mean that there is a right created that is unmoored from copyright law. 
Moreover, what does it actually mean for Congress to intend to have a 
clause that makes circumvention of TPMs protecting copyrighted works 
prohibited?  Why would this copyright protection be totally unconnected from 
infringement?  While the Ninth Circuit may try to shore up its position by 
claiming that 1201(c) in fact prevents claims by anyone not owning a 
copyright that is being protected by a TPM, this would not go far enough.  
 
156. Id. at 978. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 989–90. 
159. Id. 
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The fact still remains that you can bundle small bits of copyrighted content 
together with non-copyrighted content, as discussed supra, and be able to 
claim a violation of §1201—even when the copyrighted material is not sought 
by the circumventer. 
In order to shore up the Ninth Circuit’s position, one would have to go too 
far in the direction of gutting §1201.  In this reading, if the intention of the 
section was merely to protect works owned by the person asserting the 
violation, the clause could apply when the only material behind the TPM was 
copyright completely owned by the party bringing the claim, or when all 
material behind the TPM was copyrighted material, and every piece of it had 
been properly licensed to the party asserting the claim.  This would certainly 
help the Ninth Circuit’s position, but it would also prevent the protection of 
any content on, for instance, web sites that sometimes host content from other 
rights holders, or collections that bundle together the works of other authors.  
Any works that curate public domain materials and include original 
commentary could not work under this reading, since we would be trying to 
prevent the absurd result of using a TPM to prohibit access to public domain 
materials. 
However, I do not think the Ninth Circuit’s position can be rescued 
without an infringement nexus.  I seriously doubt that the legislative intent 
can be plausibly read in this case to suggest that Congress wanted to create a 
loophole by which third parties can assert property rights in others’ copyrights 
or in public domain works.  Courts could certainly create schemes to try and 
manage the wide variety of content arrangements and parse out how to 
ascertain when a TPM circumvention was acceptable and when it wasn’t.  
However, this is by far not the simplest mechanism available.  The Federal 
Circuit’s infringement nexus creates a very elegant solution. So what exactly 
was the intent of creating §1201(a), particularly in light of the fact that by 
requiring an infringement nexus, we essentially merge the actual 
circumvention with the infringement? 
I believe that §1201(a) plausibly makes an intent to infringe a new way of 
enforcing existing rights. If a plaintiff can demonstrate circumstantial 
evidence that a circumventer was trying to infringe upon a protected work, 
even if they were not ultimately successful, or later had a change of heart after 
acquiring the content, §1201 provides a cause of action.  The important point 
remains that the circumventer was attempting to use the content in a way 
forbidden by the existing scheme of rights guaranteed but he Copyright Act, 
and the anti-circumvention provision simply provide a new avenue for 
enforcing those rights.  In this reading, we avoid creating new property rights, 
and we also give life to the intention of the framers that the existing rights to 
works protected under the Copyright Act remain unaffected. 
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b. Superfluities 
The rule of superfluities directs judges and justices to interpret a statute in 
such a way as to give effect to all the parts of a statute.160  However, this 
canon is rather complicated within the context of §1201.  On the one hand, 
according to Gluck and Bressman, it may be entirely reasonable to expect 
superfluous clauses to make their way into legislation.161 
Gluck and Bressman have characterized the situation of statutory drafters 
as being presented with “institutional barriers” that prevented them from 
being able to avoid redundancy in statutes.162  According to Gluck and 
Bressman, although 62% of the drafters in their study were aware that courts 
assiduously attempted to interpret statutes in order to avoid superfluous 
clauses, only 18% of respondents said such a consideration mattered rarely, 
and 45% said it mattered sometimes.163 
Two reasons were given to account for the rare consideration that the rule 
of superfluities garnered from statutory drafters.  First, drafters were foremost 
concerned with covering all of the desired terrain, and erred “on the side of 
redundancy to ‘capture the universe’ or ‘because you just want to be sure you 
hit it.’”164  Second, drafters frequently face political and lobbying pressure to 
include words and phrases, and they comply in order to make sure the bill 
proceeds, even when there may be a redundancy.165 
Moreover, this sort of political compromise doesn’t occur only in large 
statutes where redundant language can be easily overlooked, but “even in 
short statutes—indeed, even within single sections of statutes . . . terms are 
often purposefully redundant to satisfy audiences other than courts.”166 
On the other hand, the DMCA exists within the context of the Copyright 
Act, and operates along side statutes such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (“CFAA”).  The CFAA has long maintained a ban on unauthorized access 
to computer systems in a manner similar to the Ninth Circuit’s view of 
§1201.167  The crucial distinction is that the CFAA requires a showing of 
damages in order to recover in a civil case.168  Thus, under the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach, the DMCA actually provides an end-run around the regime created 
by the CFAA by allowing TPM’s to provide for damages. 
 
160. Krishnakumar, supra note 114, at 243. 
161. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 145, at 934. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 935. 
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2014). 
168. Id. at § 1030(g). 
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For instance, in 2003, a company sued a software contractor for accessing 
its computer systems using a password protected VPN.169The company was 
unable to prevail under the CFAA and electronic trespass claims because they 
could not prove any actual damages.170  However, it did prevail on a motion to 
dismiss because a VPN constituted a TPM within the meaning of §1201.171  
The plaintiff was able to succeed in using a copyright statute to make a 
“hacking” claim, where it could not succeed under the actual hacking law—
the CFAA.172 
Similarly, Ticketmaster was able to obtain a preliminary injunction 
against a company that had written software that evaded Ticketmaster’s 
CAPTCHA system.173 While the CFAA was unavailable as a basis, owing to a 
lack of demonstrable damages,174 the DMCA was available since the 
CAPTCHA codes effectively prevented access to Ticketmaster’s copyrighted 
webpages.175 Even though the activity in question was one that had no aim at 
copyright infringement, indeed was a sort of harm wholly different from those 
affecting copyright entitlements, Ticketmaster was able to prevail. 
Thus, it appears that §1201 swallows up the carefully delineated 
prohibitions of the CFAA.  Congress considered what should be actionable in 
the context of hacking and wrote that into law as the CFAA.  However, when 
drafting the DMCA, they (it would appear) inadvertently opened up a whole 
new cause of action that effectively makes the CFAA superfluous. 
There is another superfluity issue that works against the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding. As discussed in Part III, supra, relying upon the Commerce Clause to 
enact a paracopyright statute may have the effect of rendering the Copyright 
Clause superfluous.  Not only does the rule against superfluities work to retain 
provisions of statutes, but the Court also relies upon it to ensure that clauses 
of the Constitution are not nullified by particular constructions of a law.176  
The Court is reluctant to disturb the “Framers’ conception of the respective 
roles of the Commerce Clause and Clause 8.”177 
Relying upon the Commerce clause to enact a provision of the Copyright 
 
169. Pearl Investments  v. Standard I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D. Me., 2003). 
170. Id. at 349. 
171. Id. at 350. 
172. Id. 
173. Ticketmaster  v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
174. Id. at 1113. 
175. Id. at 1112. 
176. Perzanowski, supra note 98, at 1101. 
177. Id.  Professor Perzanowki has observed that “[r]egardless of the precise scope of the 
commerce power, intellectual property regimes of the sort found in the Patent and Copyright Acts 
were thought to require a separate and additional source of authority.” Id. at 1102. 
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Act that provides to copyright holders a new form of property right may be 
just the sort of legislation that violates this principle.  If Congress has easy 
resort to the Commerce Clause to violate the Copyright Clause, the Copyright 
Clause could become a nullity. 
c. The Golden Rule 
The mother of all consequentialist canons is undoubtedly the rule that 
statutes should not be construed to produce absurd results. By definition, the 
absurdity doctrine is oriented precisely to avoiding bad policy 
consequences[.]178 
The Federal Circuit recognized at least one glaring contradiction with a 
no-nexus approach to §1201.  That is, without an infringement nexus, the 
Copyright Act could become contradictory.179  The court noted that § 
1201(c)(1) explicitly directs that “nothing in this section shall affect rights, 
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including Fair 
Use, under this title.”180  Thus, if § 1201(a)(2) truly were creating a new right 
unmoored from the §106 list of rights, it would be in effect altering rights, 
remedies and defenses under the Copyright Act.181 
Moreover, not only does §1201(a)(2) potentially threaten Fair Use and 
public domain material, but, read literally, it has the absurd effect of creating 
a sort of property right in other holder’s copyrights.  Were a person to include 
a copyrighted fragment that they owned in a collection that also contained the 
copyrighted works of a third party, theoretically they would have a cause of 
action against a person who evades the technological protection in order to 
access the work owned by another creator.  Of course the wielder of §1201(a) 
here would also be liable for copyright infringement for copying the work of 
someone else, which only underscores the absurdity that such a literal “right” 
would entail. 
How does it makes sense that within the Copyright Act there is a 
provision that would seemingly allow causes of action wholly unrelated to 
actual copyright infringement?  Particularly in light of the fact that Congress 
had seen fit to establish a well known, and well prosecuted computer access 
regime in the CFAA.  Can it really be reasonable to presume that Congress 
intended to short-circuit the balance of interests established in CFAA—
essentially contradicting itself with the DMCA? 
The real world outcomes of a no-nexus §1201 have already developed in 
 
178. Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2011). 
179. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
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ways that are arguably absurd.  For example, following the enactment of the 
DMCA, the White House noticed a decline in security research related to 
fears over anti-circumvention, ostensibly related to fears of violating the pure 
access rights granted by §1201.182  In another case, a foreign programmer was 
jailed when visiting the United States for having worked on a software 
program that allowed users to convert a protected Adobe format into an 
ordinary PDF, even without any alleged copyright infringement.183 
Section 1201 has also supplied new tools for companies to use when 
vying for market share.  For instance, by relying upon §1201, Craigslist was 
effectively able to prevent third-party services from providing automated tools 
to allow users an easier means of posting Craigslist ads.184  In another case, 
Nikon was able to use §1201 to obtain market leverage over Adobe and other 
digital photo software companies by encrypting portions of the RAW format 
their digital cameras use for storage – even without Nikon having any claim to 
a copyright, and in a manner that aggressively undermines software and 
hardware interoperability.185 
There are more examples of legal action that severely stretches the 
applicability of this provision within the Copyright Act to provide a catchall 
computer access law.  The salient point here, is that it is absurd to hold that a 
provision of a copyright law could provide a powerful general legal tool 
against computer use generally, particularly when existing laws already do the 
work that §1201 is purported to perform. 
However, the Ninth Circuit appears oblivious to the contradictions 
embedded in the language of the access provision.  The court claimed that the 
access provision creates a right that is outside of traditional copyright 
infringement, and yet is directed against copyright infringement.186  Without 
realizing it, the Ninth Circuit there acknowledges that the very purpose of the 
provision must require some connection to a protected right. 
As discussed, supra, the Ninth Circuit’s broad reading of §1201 could 
give a person the ability to apply a TPM to a public domain work, or even the 
copyrighted work of another, and yet have recourse over third parties that 
access that content by circumventing his TPM.  The Ninth Circuit’s approach 
 
182. Jonathan Band, Congress Unknowingly Undermines Cyber-Security, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (2002) available at http://www.policybandwidth.com/publications/JBand-
IPCyberSecurity.pdf. 
183. Lawrence Lessig, Jail Time in the Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES A7 (2001), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/30/opinion/30LESS.html. 
184. Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
185. Michael R. Tompkins, Nikon Encrypts RAW File Data, IMAGING RESOURCE (2005), 
available at http://www.imaging-resource.com/NEWS/1113977781.html. 
186. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 946 (9th Cir. 2010).  
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provides no principled basis for marking this sort of instance out from the 
cases it envisions would properly operate within the provision.187 Thus, 
without an infringement nexus, a broad reading of §1201 risks running the 
statute into absurdity. 
d. Pragmatic Considerations 
There are two ideas that need to be considered in order to round out an 
analysis of the interpretive landscape that a Supreme Court review of §1201 is 
likely to meet.  First, scholars have noted that, textualism and canons 
notwithstanding, at times the Court comes down to a bare consequentialist 
justification for its holdings.188 
Professor Shachter noted, for instance, that Justice Scalia, the great 
defender of textualism, would eschew a preferred reading of a statute if “it 
would undermine settlement incentives, lead to expensive factual inquiries, 
generate boondoggles, create a zany system, or produce perverse policy 
results of various stripes.”189  She characterized Justice Scalia in these cases as 
“straightforwardly consequentialist.”190 
Consequentialism extends beyond Justice Scalia.  In one term, Professor 
Schachter recorded that consequentialism appeared prominently in 73% of the 
Court’s decisions.191 Further, in another study of Supreme Court decisions 
between 1890 and 1990, it was found that Consequentialist considerations 
were featured in 28.8% of decisions.192 
Given this propensity of the Court to look to the real consequences of a 
law when choosing when and how to follow the text or the legislative intent, it 
is reasonable to presume that the track record of §1201 will come under 
scrutiny.  The unexpected results offered, supra, when discussing the 
avoidance of absurdities are far from isolated.  MDY presented the case of a 
person trying to make a profit by breaking Blizzard’s rules. Perhaps this was a 
 
187. The Ninth Circuit opined that a valid extra-copyright entitlement provided by § 1201 
includes something like a contractual enforcement mechanism.  “[W]e would deprive copyright 
owners of the important enforcement tool that Congress granted them to make sure that they are 
compensated for valuable non-infringing access—for instance, copyright owners who make movies 
or music available online, protected by an access control measure, in exchange for direct or indirect 
payment.” Id. at 950.  The oddity in this position, however, is that accessing a copyrighted work with 
a computer and without the authorization of the creator is already an infringement insofar as § 106 
defines the rights of the copyright holder as ones of use and authorization.   
188. Schacter, supra note 178, at 1013–14. 
189. Id.  
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 1014. 
192. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical 
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1097 (1992). 
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factor in the Ninth Circuit’s strict view of §1201.  However, depending on the 
case that reaches the Supreme Court, the facts may not be so easily construed 
in favor of finding the access right without an infringement nexus. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit pegged much of its holding to legislative 
history.193 Immediately upon becoming a Supreme Court Justice, Justice 
Scalia enjoyed a certain influence, even if unspoken, that has over time tended 
to reduce reliance of the Court upon legislative history.194  Further, the Court 
tends not to rely particularly upon pure textualism, legislative history, or the 
Golden Rule, but instead uses a variety of interpretive tools in order to ensure 
coherence in the law.195  Practically, this reinforces the sense that textualism 
will not be the decisive mode of interpretation when construing §1201.  
However, among the possible alternatives, how would the Court likely choose 
its tools? 
Anita S. Krishnakumar’s empirical study of the Roberts Court from 2005 
through 2008 provides a guiding light for judging the outlines of the answer to 
this question.196  Professor Krishnakumar classified the interpretational 
methods of the Justices into a number of categories, of which, relevant to this 
Paper are “Text/Plain Meaning,” “Practical Consequences,” “Whole Act 
Rule” (which includes Superfluities),  “Legislative History,” and “Intent.”197 
Intent and Legislative History are by far the least often utilized tools 
among the justices when reaching a holding.198  Text/Plain Meaning is the 
dominant mode of interpretation found, with eight Justices using it as one of 
their top three interpretative lenses.199  While, Practical Consequences is a top 
three selection for six Justices, and the Whole Act rule is the third most 
popular interpretive lens for seven Justices.200  Legislative History has only 
four Justices relying on it as part of their holdings, and of them it ranks 
second for one Justice, and third for three justices.201  Intent enjoys the least 
 
193. Law & Zaring, supra note 134, at 1715. 
194. William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1983). 
195. Krishnakumar, supra note 114, at 279. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 231–32. In all Professor Krishnakumar examines 14 different interpretive schemes.  
However, as noted above, the likely conflict in a case over § 1201 will come between a side that 
relies upon a Plain Text or Legislative History approach against a side that relies upon the spirit of 
the Copyright Act or the practical consequences of § 1201 at large.   
198. Id. at table 3. Each Justice was assigned a rank of the percentage of times they relied 
upon a particular interpretation device. 
199. Id. 
200. Professor Krishnakumar used the Whole Act Rule to describe the sense in which an Act 
must be viewed as a whole, and within the context of the law in which it operates.  This includes the 
notion of superfluities addressed supra Part IV.a.ii.2.   
201. Id. 
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popularity with just two Justices using it as their third most popular 
interpretive lens. 
Further, the Ninth Circuit’s extensive reliance upon legislative history 
may be unfounded.  Concomitant with Justice Scalia’s championing of the 
“new textualism,”202 was the diminution of the practical effect of legislative 
history from his early time on the court.  The overall reliance upon legislative 
history has been declining over time. 
Brudney and Ditslear found that, when reaching decisions in statutory 
interpretation cases, Legislative History was featured only 29% of the time by 
1986.203  This was a decline from a high of between 40% and 50% in 1969.204 
According to Law and Zaring, by 2004, just 11.1% of opinions featured 
legislative history as a component in the holding.205 
This evidence has only been reinforced by Professor Krishakumar’s 
research showing the relative weakness of Congressional Intent and 
Legislative History as interpretive tools in recent Supreme Court decisions.206 
However, it is important to note that a Supreme Court rescue of §1201 
would not be out of step with the expectations of those who draft 
Congressional legislation, either.  According to Professor Gluck, legislation 
drafters regularly assume that courts will construe statutes in a way that 
allows them to be upheld.207 
Thus, pragmatically, it is most likely the case that the two pillars upon 
which the Ninth Circuit constructed its holding are not quite as solid as 
expected.  Courts very rarely stop at the text—even obvious text.  And when 
the analysis proceeds, it is increasingly rare for the decision to turn upon the 
weight of legislative history. 
The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, takes the textualist and 
intentionalist view seriously, but remains focused on the larger context in 
which the law operates.  It noted that the DMCA does not create a new 
property right for copyright owners, it merely allows for new grounds for 
liability.208  This includes, of course, the trafficking in tools meant to aid in 
circumventing TPMs in order to access copyright materials and, as I have 
suggested above, could include the circumvention of a TPM as an intent to 
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(2006).   
204. Id. 
205. Law & Zaring, supra note 134, at 1715. 
206. Krishnakumar, supra note 114, at 279. 
207. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 145, at 947–48. 
208. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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infringe. 
The Federal Circuit’s policy concerns are also very informative.  
Particularly within the field of embedded software products, allowing 
manufacturers of devices to prohibit use with competing products, §1201 
would essentially grant manufacturers peculiar exemptions from anti-trust law 
and the copyright misuse doctrine.209  Coupled with the observation that 
§1201 provides for a shortcut around the strictures of a suit brought under the 
CFAA, the no-nexus reading of the clause creates a troublesome set of legal 
loopholes.  The broader goal of the DMCA was to rebalance the interests of 
the public against the rights of copyright holders in light of the expansion of 
digital media.210  It is a mistake to construe the DMCA as creating expansive 
new property rights that allow a disruption of traditional rights of the public, 
including Fair Use and access to public domain materials. 
CONCLUSION 
Assuming, for argument’s sake, that the Ninth Circuit’s preferred 
approach of textualism, supported by legislative history, is the proper way to 
view §1201, the problems outlined in Part I, supra, remain.  Section 1201 is 
not clearly an enactment that is legitimate under the Copyright Clause power 
of Congress.  Moreover, as a paracopyright enacted under the Commerce 
Clause, it will still likely be restricted as an exercise of Congress’s Copyright 
Power. 
However, as outlined in Part III, textualism will probably not be the end 
of a Supreme Court analysis of §1201 anyway.  Further, based upon the 
empirical evidence, legislative history will not be the decisive factor in a 
Supreme Court ruling.  This is of course leaving aside the fact that the Federal 
Circuit also offered support for its holding derived from a reading of 
legislative history. 
The Ninth Circuit claims that §1201(a)—with its focus on mere access 
control—should be contrasted with §1201(c)—where the focus is on 
protecting particular rights under the Copyright Act.  This is because, in the 
court’s view, the distinction clearly suggests that §1201(a) was intended to 
create a new sort of right.  However, this still does not rescue the Ninth 
Circuit’s no-nexus approach.  As noted by Professor Gluck, staffers will 
frequently overdraft statutes in order to make sure they covered their intended 
ground.211  Further, as discussed supra at length, it could not have plausibly 
been the intention of Congress to create a property loophole in §1201, nor 
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could it have been the intention of Congress to require courts to parse the 
infinite variety of media in order to ascertain when a rights holder would be 
able to use §1201 for protection of their content.  The Federal Circuit’s 
infringement-nexus requirement is direct and focused, and solves the problem. 
The textualist and intentionalist canons are read fairly with a nexus 
approach.  Congress explicitly stated that it did not intend to alter rights by 
enacting the DMCA, and the clear language of §1201(a) states only a method 
of protection, and does not clearly state that a new property right was being 
created.  Moreover, the policy concerns noted by the Federal Circuit – 
including the fear of disrupting access to the public domain and Fair Use, and 
a concern for providing an end-run around antitrust laws and the copyright 
misuse doctrine – create a compelling reason to acknowledge the nexus 
requirement. 
The Ninth Circuit pointed out a valid superfluity concern in reading an 
infringement nexus into §1201.212  The infringement-nexus approach could 
effectively prevent a new cause of action for the pure violation of the TPM, 
since, if there is an infringement anyway, there is no need for a cause for the 
TPM violation.  However, this would only affect §1201(a)(1) since 
§§1201(a)(2) and 1201(b), which prevent the trafficking in such technologies, 
would still be operative.  Persons who distribute technology that is intended to 
enable persons to infringe the copyrights of others would still be liable under 
§1201.  While it may be argued that §1201(a)(1) becomes redundant, reading 
the law in this way actually avoids making the entire CFAA redundant by 
allowing §1201(a) to operate as a lower-requirement computer hacking law. 
However, §1201 need not be redundant, even if there is an infringement 
nexus requirement.  As suggested above, the circumvention of the TPM can 
amount to an “intent to infringe” when no actual infringement has occurred.  
In this view, if circumstantial evidence can be martialled that demonstrates 
the circumventer was actively trying to infringe upon a protected work when 
bypassing the security mechanisms, there could be a cause of action.  There 
will still be an action for pure circumvention, and there will be an 
infringement nexus—§1201 continues to function in a way that does not 
generate new property rights, but merely affords a new method of enforcing 
existing rights. 
However, even granting the Ninth Circuit its superfluity concern that 
concern is far from the only such superfluity concern to apply to the DMCA.  
Without an infringement nexus, a major portion of the CFAA is rendered 
duplicative.  Further, if Congress were to rely solely upon its Commerce 
power to extend a paracopyright copyright unmoored from the strictures of 
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the Copyright Clause, the Copyright Clause would be reduced to a nullity.  To 
adopt the Federal Circuit’s infringement nexus requirement is to more 
carefully constrain the operation of §1201.  It would retain the existing 
balance of rights in the Copyright Act and under the CFAA, and would avoid 
the absurd consequences of turning the Copyright Act into a general computer 
hacking statute. 
 
